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APPRENDI-LAND OPENS ITS BORDERS: WILL THE SUPREME 
COURT’S DECISION IN SOUTHERN UNION CO. V. UNITED STATES 
EXTEND APPRENDI’S REACH TO RESTITUTION? 
INTRODUCTION 
The right to a trial by jury has ancient roots in the Anglo-American legal 
system, being included in Magna Carta in 1215,1 and later codified in the Bill 
of Rights of the United States Constitution.2 The right to a trial by jury has 
been called “the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties,”3 requiring 
that “the ‘truth of every accusation’ against a defendant ‘should afterwards be 
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and 
neighbours.’”4 When attempting to delineate the boundaries of this right, the 
tension between the government and its citizens is highlighted. The 
government has a strong interest in establishing and overseeing its regime of 
criminal law, empowering its judges and officers, as well as enabling its 
legislature to pass laws proscribing certain behavior and determining the 
appropriate punishment for violating these laws. However, a citizen’s right to 
know what behavior is prohibited and when and how the punishment for such 
behavior will be determined and distributed, as well as a fundamental right to 
fairness in the criminal process is well-documented.5 Due to the fundamental 
nature of the powers in question, the interests of the government and its 
citizens can often be found squarely at odds with each other along this 
spectrum. 
The U.S. Supreme Court shifted this balance of power in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey,6 where it held for the first time that any fact relied upon to increase a 
 
 1. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84 (1942) (“Since it was first recognized in Magna 
Carta, trial by jury has been a prized shield against oppression . . . .”). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
 3. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540 
(4th ed. 1873). 
 4. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)). 
 5. See Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 335 (2005) (defining and describing the “principle of legality”). Robinson describes 
the “principle of legality” as the proposition that “criminal liability and punishment can be based 
only upon a prior legislative enactment of a prohibition that is expressed with adequate precision 
and clarity.” Id. at 336. 
 6. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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sentence beyond the maximum prescribed by statute must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.7 This was a radical departure from established law 
to that point; the dissent in Apprendi complained that the Court had baselessly 
altered a significant paradigm of criminal law, taking away judicial discretion 
and limiting the options available to Congress and state legislatures to define 
criminal offenses and their sentences.8 The Court found that the common-law 
requirement that an “indictment must allege whatever is in law essential to the 
punishment sought to be inflicted” was a controlling concept in the United 
States’ history of criminal law and punishment,9 and the result was a bright-
line rule that would be viewed as a “revolution in sentencing.”10 And so, 
“Apprendi-land”11 was born. 
Like many other constitutional issues, Apprendi’s rule presented a matter 
of balancing the government’s interests with its citizens’ interest in a 
constitutionally protected right. The government’s interest at stake is by no 
means inconsequential; Apprendi implicates long-standing norms in judicial 
discretion and Congressional powers to legislate,12 but there is a significant 
interest in efficiency and practicality as well.13 This is counter-balanced by a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, as well as the interest in 
receiving a punishment based upon a statute.14 Additionally a defendant has a 
constitutionally protected interest in a jury verdict where one is required, as 
opposed to the whim of the judge, who is no more qualified than a jury to 
accurately and efficiently determine the facts required for conviction.15 While 
Apprendi certainly shifted this balance of power, this debate has continued in 
 
 7. Id. at 490. 
 8. Id. at 524–26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 9. 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50 
(2d ed. 1872). See also id. at 51 (“[T]he indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which 
is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted.”). The Court in Apprendi cited to several 
high state courts from the same time period that cited to and approved of this definition. 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 511–12. 
 10. See, e.g., LAURIE L. LEVENSON & ALEX RICCIARDULLI, THE RUTTER GROUP-
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 1:4 (2012–2013). 
 11. The term “Apprendi-land” was coined by Justice Scalia. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584, 613 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Concisely put, Justice Breyer is on the wrong flight; he 
should either get off before the doors close, or buy a ticket to Apprendi-land.”). 
 12. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524–26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s rule 
as encroaching upon accepted powers and practices of judges). 
 13. Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority’s rule was “impractical” and 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, as well as potentially leading to unwanted and 
disparate outcomes in criminal trials). 
 14. Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Apprendi contemplates the legality principle when he 
says “[under Apprendi’s rule,] the criminal will never get more punishment than he bargained for 
when he did the crime.” Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 15. Id. 
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the discussion of a variety of topics, from the potential imposition of the death 
penalty, to the imposition of criminal fines and restitution. 
This interplay between judge, jury, defendant, and victim is especially 
complex in the context of criminal restitution. While the current federal 
restitution statutes are found in the criminal code,16 there has been debate as to 
whether restitution is a criminal punishment that furthers the traditional 
punitive goals of deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation, or if it is simply a 
civil remedy intended only to make the victim “whole.”17 Beyond this 
threshold question of whether restitution is even a “criminal” remedy is the 
issue of how restitution orders are authorized and determined under the federal 
restitution statutes.18 The mere fact that restitution exists is not what prompts a 
potential Apprendi issue; the problem lies in the way that restitution is 
determined. Under the current federal restitution framework, certain classes of 
offenses will require a judge to make a mandatory order of restitution upon a 
guilty verdict or plea.19 Moreover, these orders need not be supported by any 
facts from the trial, or guilty plea, or even the elements of the crime in 
question; the court on its own initiative finds these facts on a simple 
preponderance of the evidence standard.20 Seeing as restitution orders can be 
millions of dollars or more,21 this is not an insignificant issue. 
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I is devoted to background, 
with respect to both restitution generally and the genesis of the rule of 
Apprendi. Part I.A will provide a short survey of both the history and current 
state of criminal restitution in the United States, including a discussion of the 
major federal restitution statutes that are applicable today. Additionally, Part 
I.A will discuss the mechanics of restitution hearings. Part I.B will introduce 
the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, including its function, purpose, and 
importance. It will also set the stage for the discussion of Apprendi’s 
 
 16. Both the Victim Witness Protection Act (VWPA) and Mandatory Victim Restitution Act 
(MVRA) are codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A–3664. 
 17. Compare Brian Kleinhaus, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil 
Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement 
Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2762–63, 2766–67 (2005) 
(concluding that federal restitution statutes should be uniformly considered as means of criminal 
punishment, not a solely civil remedy), with Matthew Spohn, A Statutory Chameleon: The 
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act’s Challenge to the Civil/Criminal Divide, 86 IOWA L. REV. 
1013, 1036–40 (2001). See also infra Part III.A. 
 18. See infra Part I.A. 
 19. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (requiring mandatory restitution for certain offenses, including 
crimes of violence and title 18 property offenses). 
 20. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 2012) (using the Mandatory 
Victim Restitution Act to order more than six million dollars in restitution against defendant that 
was found guilty of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and various other 
offenses). 
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subsequent line of cases in Part II. Part II will provide a summary of the 
Court’s holdings in these cases, and isolate and analyze specific language in 
these decisions that suggest their eventual application to the facts underlying 
criminal restitution. Specifically, the evolution of several terms of art used by 
the Court in these decisions will be analyzed with an eye towards their future 
application to criminal restitution. Finally, Part III will consolidate the 
holdings in the Apprendi line of cases, and argue that the rule of these cases 
logically and rightfully extends to cover criminal restitution. Part III will also 
analyze and refute the common arguments put forth by the circuits of the 
United States Court of Appeals against applying Apprendi to criminal 
restitution. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Restitution Generally: A Brief Overview22 
1. History and Contemporary Statutory Basis 
The authorization and use of restitution in the United States’ federal 
criminal system was infrequent through most of the twentieth century.23 This 
infrequent use can be attributed to the lack of overt authority American courts 
had before the 1980s, as restitution has no explicit basis in the United States 
Constitution.24 Courts’ authority to order restitution is purely statutory, and 
until 1982, the only federal statute authorizing restitution was the Federal 
Probation Act of 1925 (FPA), which left any restitution order to the complete 
discretion of the court.25 In 1982, Congress passed the Victim Witness 
Protection Act (VWPA),26 which currently acts as the primary statutory source 
for restitution as a component of a federal sentence. While the VWPA is the 
courts’ underlying authority for restitution orders, Congress has since passed 
several mandatory restitution provisions, including the Child Support Recovery 
Act (CSRA),27 the Violence Against Women Act,28 and, most significantly, the 
 
 22. See Kleinhaus, supra note 17, at 2717–28 (giving a more detailed overview of the 
history of restitution, both globally and in the United States). 
 23. See S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2536 (“As 
simple as the principle of restitution is, it lost its priority status in the sentencing procedures of 
our federal courts long ago.”). 
 24. See generally U.S. CONST. (containing no explicit mention or authorization of restitution 
as a remedy). 
 25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651–3656 (1982) (repealed 1984). 
 26. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512–
1515, 3663, 3664 (2006)). 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2006) (mandating restitution of child support payments due in all 
convictions of willful failure to pay past due child support). 
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Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA).29 Because the VWPA 
was discretionary, federal judges ordered restitution in only 20.2% of all 
cases,30 a proportion that Congress was not satisfied with, leading to the 
passage of the MVRA.31 
Under the MVRA, a restitution order must be issued to all identifiable 
victims of certain crimes for the full amount of the victims’ physical and/or 
economic losses, without consideration of the defendant’s economic 
circumstances.32 If the underlying criminal act qualifies under the MVRA for 
mandatory restitution, the government bears the burden of proving by only a 
preponderance of the evidence the essential facts for determining a restitution 
order;33 moreover, these facts are found solely by the judge at sentencing.34 
2. The Mechanics of Restitution at Sentencing35 
The MVRA establishes procedures for issuing and enforcing a restitution 
order. First, the court directs the probation officer to obtain and provide 
information in the form of a pre-sentence report (PSR), which acts as the 
primary record of fact during sentencing.36 Any dispute over the factual 
findings in the PSR is determined at the judge’s sole discretion on a 
preponderance of evidence standard.37 The PSR must also include a complete 
accounting of each victim’s loss, the amount of restitution, if any, owed 
pursuant to a plea agreement, and information relating to the defendant’s 
economic status.38 After receiving the PSR, a judge may act solely on the basis 
of the report, request additional documentation from either party, or conduct a 
 
 28. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (adding mandatory restitution for sexual 
abuse, sexual exploitation of children, domestic violence, and telemarketing fraud) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 13925–14045d (2010)). 
 29. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (requiring mandatory restitution for certain 
offenses, including crimes of violence and title 18 property offenses) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
3664 (2002)). 
 30. See S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 13 (1996). 
 31. Id. 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A; William Acker, Jr., The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is 
Unconstitutional. Will Courts Say So After Southern Union v. United States?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 
803, 811 (2013). 
 33. Id. § 3664(e). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See generally Acker, supra note 32, at 811–16 (discussing the procedure and 
requirements of restitution orders made pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act). 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). Acker, supra note 32, at 813. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(B) 
(2009) (“If the law permits restitution, the probation officer must conduct an investigation and 
submit a report [containing] sufficient information for the court to order restitution.”). 
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (2006). 
 38. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (2006); Acker, supra note 32, at 813. 
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separate restitution hearing.39 The most important attribute of this procedure is 
that at no time is a jury involved; it is all handled by the court on a 
preponderance standard, and often times the PSR contains otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay,40 facts neither presented to nor found by a jury during 
trial,41 and facts not admitted to by the defendant in his or her plea 
agreement.42 Further, these orders routinely mandate restitution for harms that, 
while occurring during or as a result of the defendant’s conduct, were not 
elements of the underlying offense the defendant was either convicted of or 
pleaded guilty to committing.43 
This imposition of restitution based solely on facts not presented to and 
found by a jury on a preponderance standard is what makes this an issue of 
constitutional law, as the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey and its progeny illustrate. 
B. Apprendi: The “Animating Principle” of the Sixth Amendment is Born 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey was a landmark 
in the law of criminal procedure. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held for the first 
time that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases a 
criminal penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to the jury to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.44 The defendant, Charles 
Apprendi, pleaded guilty to multiple counts of second-degree weapons 
offenses;45 however, the trial judge, using a preponderance of the evidence 
standard at sentencing, found that Apprendi’s actions satisfied New Jersey’s 
hate crime statute,46 and used that statute to “enhance” his sentence beyond the 
 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(4); Acker, supra note 32, at 814. 
 40. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 304 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) 
(describing presentence reports as “hearsay-riddled”). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Morganfield, 450 Fed. Appx. 400, 401 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding 
no error where the district court relied upon factual findings in the PSR to determine the amount 
of restitution, which was supplemented post-trial to include an FBI report and other supporting 
documentation). 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 65–66 (1st Cir. 2005) (“A PSR 
generally bears ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to permit the district court to rely on it at 
sentencing.’ The defendant may object to facts in the PSR, but ‘if his objections to the PSR are 
merely rhetorical and unsupported by countervailing proof, the district court is entitled to rely on 
the facts in the PSR.’” (internal citations omitted)); United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 329 
(5th Cir. 1998) (“Facts contained in a PSR are considered reliable and may be adopted without 
further inquiry if the defendant fails to present competent rebuttal evidence. . . . Mere objections 
do not suffice as competent rebuttal evidence.”). 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Donaby, 349 F.3d 1046, 1054 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The text of the 
VWPA [and] the MVRA . . . do[es] not limit restitution to the elements of the offense.”). 
 44. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 45. Id. at 469–70. 
 46. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 1999). 
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statutory maximum for the second-degree weapons charge alone.47 The statute 
in question provided a defendant the right to a jury trial, with proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard on the firearm charge.48 However, it also gave the 
judge sole discretion in determining the crime’s motivation on a preponderance 
standard, which could enhance the sentence under New Jersey’s hate crime 
statute.49 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found that the statute in 
question violated Apprendi’s due process rights, as well as his Sixth 
Amendment right to a trial by jury.50 
This case was viewed by many as a “revolution” in sentencing,51 which the 
Court justified by examining the “jury tradition that is an indispensable part of 
our justice system.”52 This justification, referred to in later cases as Apprendi’s 
“animating principle,”53 stemmed from the historic role of English trial judges 
at common law, where the judge had “very little explicit discretion in 
sentencing . . . . The judge was meant simply to impose that sentence [which 
the criminal law in question specifically prescribed].”54 While acknowledging 
that judges have had, and will continue to have, some discretion in 
sentencing,55 the Court delineated more specifically the limits of judicial 
discretion in criminal sentencing in American law as follows: 
We should be clear that nothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible 
for judges to exercise discretion—taking into consideration various factors 
relating both to offense and offender—in imposing a judgment within the 
range prescribed by statute. We have often noted that judges in this country 
have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within 
statutory limits in the individual case. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 
U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (“[B]oth before and since the American colonies became 
a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which 
[a judge could exercise wide discretion in determining] the kind and extent of 
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law” (emphasis added)).56 
Equally important as to what the Court stated explicitly in Apprendi is 
what it did not. The Court did not eliminate all judicial discretion at 
 
 47. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471. 
 48. Id. at 491. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 497. 
 51. See, e.g., LEVENSON & RICCIARDULLI, supra note 10. 
 52. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497. 
 53. See, e.g., S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2351 (2012) (affirming 
Apprendi’s “animating principal” as “the preservation of the jury’s historic role as a bulwark 
between the State and the accused.”). 
 54. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479. 
 55. Id. at 481. 
 56. Id. 
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sentencing.57 Nor did it restrict its holding to any one type or class of criminal 
punishment; the trial court enhanced the defendant’s sentence to twelve years 
(above the statutory maximum of ten years for that specific count of the 
conviction) of incarceration, but the Court referred only to the increase of 
“penalties” throughout its opinion.58 This reference to “penalties,” along with 
the uncertain nature of what exactly is contemplated by the phrase “statutory 
maximum,”59 opened the door to arguments in favor of expanding Apprendi’s 
rule to explicitly encompass other specific criminal penalties that trial judges 
before had nearly unfettered discretion at sentencing to determine within the 
state’s existing statutory framework. 
Even though the 5-4 decision was thought by some to be somewhat of an 
aberration60 due in part to the unusual composition of the majority and 
dissenting coalitions,61 it has proven to have staying power, evidenced by the 
subsequent line of cases in the following years. These cases extended the jury 
fact-finding requirement to capital cases,62 further (and more broadly) defined 
the phrase “statutory maximum” with regards to its place in the Apprendi 
doctrine,63 ended the mandatory nature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,64 
and extended the jury requirement to more categories of punishments, 
including criminal fines.65 Moreover, while Apprendi’s language alone does 
not offer an exceedingly persuasive argument for the expansion of its holding 
to criminal restitution, the Court’s language in its subsequent Apprendi 
jurisprudence does.66 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 490. 
 59. Justice Breyer’s dissent discussed this ambiguity, stating that “the majority, in support of 
its constitutional rule, emphasizes the concept of a statutory ‘maximum.’ . . . I do not understand 
its relevance.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 563 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 60. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 388 (2002) 
(“Neither of the two limitations set by Apprendi, pertaining to criminal history and statutory 
maxima, respectively, can stand much scrutiny. Each . . . is vulnerable to elimination once an 
appropriate vehicle for overturning its supporting precedent arrives at the Court . . . .”). 
 61. Justices Stevens delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, 
Thomas, and Ginsburg, while Justice O’Connor wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468. 
 62. Ring, 536 U.S. at 585 (holding that the trial judge violated defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights by relying on a judicial finding of fact to authorize the death penalty). 
 63. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301–05 (2004). See also infra Part II.A. 
 64. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 327 (2005). See also infra Part II.B. 
 65. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2348–49 (2012); See infra Part II.D. 
 66. See infra Part II. 
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II.  THE EVOLUTION AND EXPANSION OF APPRENDI’S RULE 
A. Blakely v. Washington 
Four years after its decision in Apprendi, the Court in Blakely v. 
Washington re-affirmed and clarified its previous holding, especially with 
regard to the definition of “statutory maximum.” Like in Apprendi, the 
defendant in Blakely pleaded guilty to an offense that by statute could not be 
punished with a sentence of more than ten years.67 However, the trial judge, 
acting in accordance with the state of Washington’s statute68 allowing the 
imposition of “a sentence above the standard range if he finds ‘substantial and 
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence,’”69 found that the 
defendant had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” which was a statutorily 
permissible ground for enhancement of the sentence beyond the ten-year 
limit.70 Relying on this finding, the trial court sentenced the defendant to more 
than three years above the fifty-three-month statutory maximum, which the 
Court overturned on appeal.71 
Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion, wrote that “the ‘statutory 
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may 
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted 
by the defendant.”72 Moreover, the “statutory maximum” is not the maximum 
sentence allowed after a judicial finding of additional facts; instead, it is the 
maximum penalty the judge may impose without any additional findings.73 
Finally, and maybe most relevant to the issue of restitution, the Court stated 
that “every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury 
all facts legally essential to the punishment.”74 
This is the first case in the Apprendi line with language strongly relevant to 
federal restitution law. To preface this, even though the criminal statutes in 
Apprendi and Blakely happened to be state statutes in New Jersey and 
Washington, respectively, these rulings will still apply to cases where the 
statute in question is federal.75 If restitution under the MVRA is a criminal 
 
 67. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299. 
 68. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535 (West 1998). 
 69. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299. 
 70. Id. at 300. 
 71. Id. at 303, 305. 
 72. Id. at 303. 
 73. Id. at 303–04. 
 74. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added). 
 75. This is the case because Apprendi and Blakely were using the Fourteenth Amendment as 
a vehicle to incorporate the requirements of the Sixth Amendment against the state statutes in 
question. Because the Sixth Amendment as written was already applicable against the federal 
government, it follows that these ruling would also apply to federal statutes. 
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penalty or punishment,76 it is clear that the “facts legally essential to the 
punishment” have not been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; the 
procedural statute for the imposition of restitution orders under the MVRA 
simply requires the probation officer to compile a post-trial, post-conviction, 
pre-sentence report that will be used by the court in formulating its restitution 
order.77 Moreover, the MVRA also provides that “[a]ny dispute as to the 
proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the 
preponderance of the evidence.”78 This is especially relevant because, while 
the underlying conviction or guilty plea may sometimes be enough to support a 
restitution order, it is far more common for the order to be based on a 
“bureaucratically prepared, hearsay-riddled presentence [report].”79 Given that 
restitution is allowed for a variety of harms, most of which, while they may 
come as a result of the underlying offense, are not essential elements of the 
offense, the facts surrounding these harms are unlikely to be brought up during 
trial or admitted to in a guilty plea, let alone proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
to a jury.80 
B. United States v. Booker 
Because the Sixth Amendment is applicable (and has been since its 
inception) against the federal government on its own,81 the Court began 
hearing cases in which a federal statute implicated Apprendi. In United States 
v. Booker, the Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were 
mandatory at the time,82 violated the jury trial requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment.83 The defendant’s case was illustrative of the then-mandatory 
nature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; the defendant was convicted of 
possessing at least fifty grams of crack cocaine, enough to support a sentence 
of 210 to 262 months of imprisonment.84 However, defendant’s actual sentence 
was 360 months, nearly ten years longer than the Guidelines range supported 
by the jury verdict alone.85 Relying on evidence presented during the 
sentencing hearing, but after the jury trial, the trial judge found that the 
 
 76. See infra Part III.A. See also Kleinhaus, supra note 17, at 2729–33. 
 77. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (2006). 
 78. Id. § 3664(e) (emphasis added). 
 79. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 304 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
 80. In fact, the absence of these facts at trial are often the basis for appeal for defendants 
claiming that restitution orders violated Apprendi. See infra Part III. 
 81. See supra note 75. 
 82. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006). 
 83. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. 
 84. Id. at 235. 
 85. Id. 
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defendant possessed an additional 556 grams of crack cocaine, and used this 
finding to support the longer sentence.86 
Justice Stevens, writing an opinion for the Court with respect to the 
applicability of Apprendi, held that the Sixth Amendment is violated by the 
imposition of an enhanced sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
based on the sentencing judge’s determination of a fact (other than a prior 
conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.87 
Interestingly, Justice Stevens’s opinion in Booker removed any mention of a 
“statutory maximum” when it reaffirmed the Apprendi holding; in his 
statement of Apprendi’s rule, he wrote simply that “[a]ny fact . . . which is 
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the 
facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the 
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”88 Further, Justice 
Breyer, who had been a dissenter in Apprendi and its progeny to that point,89 
wrote the opinion of the Court with respect to the mandatory nature of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.90 Justice Breyer (1) held that the provision of 
the Federal Sentencing Act making the Guidelines mandatory did not comport 
with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, and (2) severed the offending 
provision, making the Guidelines only advisory rather than mandatory.91 
Justice Breyer reasoned that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines would lead 
to disparate outcomes and evinced Congress’s “unintentional” introduction of 
complexity into the sentencing process.92 
Booker is important to restitution for two reasons. First, the removal of the 
“statutory maximum” language from Apprendi’s rule makes it more intuitive to 
apply to restitution. The “statutory maximum” language has been one of the 
major roadblocks for the federal Courts of Appeals to apply Apprendi to 
restitution orders.93 If the rule eschews that language, which Justice Stevens’s 
opinion in Booker does, it follows that the only thing preventing restitution 
from coming under Apprendi’s influence is its uncertain status as a civil or 
criminal penalty, which has not been definitively addressed by the Supreme 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 245. 
 88. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. 
 89. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296, 297 (2004). 
 90. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244; Acker, supra note 32, at 806. 
 91. Id. at 250. 
 92. Id. at 252–55. 
 93. See, e.g., United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 904 (2005) (finding that criminal 
restitution does not violate Apprendi because the MVRA prescribes no “statutory maximum”); 
United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the MVRA does not 
include a “statutory maximum” that could be increased by a given finding). See also infra Part 
III.B. 
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Court.94 Further, finding the “mandatory” nature of the Sentencing Guidelines 
to be severable as unconstitutional has parallels to the mandatory nature of the 
MVRA, and while the specific constitutionality of the MVRA is outside the 
scope of this Article, there is an argument to be made using this line of 
reasoning.95 For the same reasons cited by Justice Breyer in severing the 
mandatory provision in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,96 the fact that the 
MVRA places the burden solely on the probation officer97 and judge, at the 
exclusion of the jury, to find the facts necessary to order restitution may be a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement. 
C. Oregon v. Ice 
While the majority of cases that followed Apprendi expanded the reach of 
its rule, not all was well in “Apprendi-land.”98 In Oregon v. Ice, the Court held 
in a 5-4 decision that in light of historical practice and the authority of the 
states over administration of their criminal justice systems, the Sixth 
Amendment does not inhibit states from assigning to judges, rather than to 
juries, finding of facts necessary to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, 
sentences for multiple offenses.99 This was a deviation for Justice Ginsburg, 
who wrote the majority opinion in Ice despite having joined the majorities in 
Apprendi and its progeny to that point.100 Justice Ginsburg, while 
acknowledging the “longstanding common-law” practice in which Apprendi’s 
rule is rooted, found that the “twin considerations”101 of Apprendi support the 
Court’s decision against extending the doctrine to preclude judicial discretion 
in these circumstances.102 
Justice Ginsburg pointed to a “historical record” demonstrating that the 
jury played no role in the decision to impose sentences consecutively or 
concurrently,103 citing to multiple treatises indicating that this was the case 
both in England before the founding of the United States, as well as in the 
 
 94. See generally Kleinhaus, supra note 17. 
 95. See generally Acker, supra note 32, at 811–16 (arguing that the MVRA in its current 
form is unconstitutional due in part to its mandatory nature). 
 96. Namely, the fact that the Guidelines contemplated only “the judge without the jury,” and 
not “the judge working together with the jury” when determining the sentence. United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 252–55 (2005). 
 97. The probation officer prepares the Presentence Report, which is the main resource used 
by the judge in fashioning a restitution order. 
 98. See supra note 11. 
 99. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 164 (2009). 
 100. Id. at 162; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 467 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 
542 U.S. 296, 297 (2004); Booker, 543 U.S. at 225. 
 101. “Historical practice and respect for state sovereignty.” Ice, 555 U.S. at 168. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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early period of American history.104 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg justified the 
Court’s reluctance to further extend Apprendi by admitting that if the judge’s 
discretion in determining concurrent and consecutive sentences was subject to 
a jury’s finding of fact, then determining the details other state initiatives such 
as supervised release, drug rehabilitation programs, community service, and 
the imposition of fines and restitution would be jeopardized as well.105 This 
language would later be used by lower courts as a reason to decline the 
extension of Apprendi to criminal fines and restitution, but the Court would 
eventually hold to extend the rule to criminal fines.106 
The dissent, led by Justice Scalia, did not agree.107 Arguing that Apprendi 
presented a “bright-line” rule, he wrote that “[a]ny fact—other than that of a 
prior conviction—that increases the maximum punishment to which a 
defendant may be sentenced must be admitted by the defendant or proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.”108 He went on to write that “Oregon’s 
sentencing scheme allows judges rather than juries to find the fact necessary to 
commit defendants to longer prison sentences, and thus directly contradicts 
what we held eight years ago and have reaffirmed several times since.”109 
Justice Scalia’s dissent provides an excellent template for the argument of 
applying Apprendi to criminal restitution. He lays out a syllogism of sorts, 
writing that: 
The judge in the case could not have imposed a sentence of consecutive prison 
terms without making the factual finding that the defendant caused “separate 
harms” to the victim by the acts that produced two convictions . . . . There can 
thus be no doubt that the judge’s factual finding was “essential to” the 
punishment he imposed. That “should be the end of the matter.”110 
If one applies this to restitution, the result would be as follows: 
The judge in this case could not have imposed a sentence [that included a 
restitution order] without making the factual finding that the defendant caused 
[the harms that qualified for restitution under the restitution statute in 
question]. There can be no doubt that the judge’s factual finding was 
 
 104. Id. at 168–69. 
 105. Id. at 171–72. 
 106. Compare United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17, 34 (1st Cir. 2010) (giving “great 
weight” to this language in Ice and characterizing it as “an express statement . . . that it would not 
be appropriate to extend Apprendi to criminal fines”), with S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 2344, 2351 (2012) (explaining that the language in Ice was dicta, and the Court had never 
distinguished one form of penal sanction from another when doing the Apprendi analysis, and 
holding that Apprendi applies to the imposition of criminal fines). 
 107. Ice, 555 U.S. at 173 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (citations omitted). 
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“essential” to the punishment he imposed. That “should be the end of the 
matter.” 
Also, while Justice Scalia’s dissent did address the majority’s fears laid out 
in its “parade of horribles,”111 which would include the potential implication of 
criminal fines and restitution orders under Apprendi, he did not agree with the 
level of concern expressed by the majority. Justice Scalia dismissed the 
majorities concerns, saying simply that “if these [supervised release, 
community service, or drug rehabilitation] courses reduce rather than augment 
the punishment that the jury verdict imposes, there is no problem.”112 The 
minority’s lack of concern about this possibility bodes well for the inclusion of 
restitution under Apprendi, as does the Court’s holding (and the makeup of the 
majority) in the next case to be discussed, Southern Union Co. v. United States. 
D. Southern Union Co. v. United States: Extending Apprendi to Criminal 
Fines 
After the Court’s decision in Ice, many commentators speculated that 
Apprendi’s reign was at an end and its reach would begin to recede.113 
However, in Southern Union Co. v. United States, Justice Sotomayor authored 
an opinion for a 6-3 majority that extended Apprendi to the imposition of 
criminal fines.114 In Southern Union, the defendant-appellant had been 
convicted by a jury of a single count of violating 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) by 
storing hazardous waste without a permit “[f]rom on or about September 19, 
2002 until on or about October 19, 2004,” a period of 762 days.115 However, 
the jury did not find the specific number of days of the defendant’s violation, 
nor the duration of any particular violation; while the statute provided a 
penalty of “not more than $50,000 for each day of violation,” the jury needed 
only to find one day’s violation to return a guilty verdict.116 At sentencing, the 
PSR set a maximum fine of $38.1 million, on the basis that the defendant 
 
 111. Id. at 177. 
 112. Ice, 555 U.S. at 177. 
 113. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Priester, Apprendi Land Becomes Bizarro World: “Policy 
Nullification” and Other Surreal Doctrines in the New Constitutional Law of Sentencing, 51 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 78 (2011) (“The decision in Ice in 2009 may have signaled the end of 
any reliable voting bloc in [the Apprendi] line of cases.”); Mark Chenoweth, Using Its Sixth 
Sense: The Roberts Court Revamps the Rights of the Accused, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 223, 
225–28 (2008–2009) (noting the weakness that Ginsburg defection from the Apprendi majority 
put in the further application of the doctrine); Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A 
Prescription for Informing Juries of the Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2223, 
2246–47 (2010) (“Ice . . . suggests a waning enthusiasm among the Justices to push Apprendi 
beyond its current boundaries.”). 
 114. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2348–49 (2012). 
 115. Id. at 2349; Acker, supra note 32, at 807. 
 116. Id. 
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violated the statute for each of the 762 days from September 19, 2002, through 
October 19, 2004.117 Defendant appealed, and the First Circuit affirmed the 
trial court’s order, though using different reasoning to do so.118 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion relied on three main premises: (1) not all 
criminal fines are so “petty” as to not trigger the Sixth Amendment’s right to a 
jury trial,119 (2) unlike Ice, where the historical record showed that the 
imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences for substantially similar 
counts of a conviction or guilty plea was at the trial judge’s discretion,120 here 
the record supports applying Apprendi to criminal fines because “the 
predominant practice was for [facts relating to the amount of criminal fine to 
levy] to be alleged in the indictment and proved to the jury,”121 and, perhaps 
most importantly, (3) the Court has never distinguished one form of 
punishment from another when applying Apprendi’s rule; its decisions 
“broadly prohibit judicial fact-finding that increases maximum criminal 
‘sentence[s],’ ‘penalties,’ or ‘punishment[s]’—terms that each undeniably 
embrace fines.”122 
Further, the majority, which included Justice Ginsburg,123 dismissed the 
trepidation shown by the Court in Ice to extend Apprendi’s rule to potentially 
cover a litany of sentencing programs, including an explicit reference to the 
imposition of criminal fines.124 Any fear of the dicta in Ice was quickly 
mollified when the Court dropped just one footnote to its Southern Union 
opinion, which stated simply: 
Ice also stated in dicta that applying Apprendi to consecutive-versus-
concurrent sentencing determinations might imperil a variety of sentencing 
decisions judges commonly make, including “the imposition of statutorily 
prescribed fines.” The Court of Appeals read this statement to mean that 
Apprendi does not apply to criminal fines. We think the statement is at most 
ambiguous, and more likely refers to the routine practice of judges imposing 
fines from within a range authorized by jury-found facts. Such a practice poses 
no problem under Apprendi because the penalty does not exceed what the 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. See United States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17, 33–36 (1st Cir. 2010) (affirming trial 
court’s sentence and holding that Apprendi does not apply to criminal fines). 
 119. S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2351–52. 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 98–112. 
 121. S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2353–54. 
 122. Id. at 2351. 
 123. Id. at 2348. Recall that Justice Ginsburg had declined to extend Apprendi just three years 
before in Ice, and the majority opinion authored by her included the fear of eventually extending 
Apprendi to embrace criminal fines as a justification for her holding. 
 124. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009). 
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jury’s verdict permits. In any event, our statement in Ice was unnecessary to 
the judgment and is not binding.125 
This is an extremely strong disclaimer and a vehicle to distance the 
Southern Union holding from the passage in Ice just three years prior. This 
bodes very well for the eventual recognition that Apprendi is applicable to 
restitution orders for two reasons: (1) it indicates that Southern Union’s 
majority may be open to extending Apprendi further, and (2) it calms any fear 
of the stability of the coalition of justices still willing to extend Apprendi to 
other punishments. 
First, this summary dismissal of a significant portion of the Court’s 
justification of its holding in Ice means that the justices making up the six-
person majority in Southern Union are likely willing to extend Apprendi to 
other items on that list, which included restitution orders.126 This footnote did 
not only disclaim the Court’s previous statement regarding criminal fines; it 
referred to the “variety of sentencing decisions” commonly made by judges, 
“including ‘the imposition of statutorily prescribed fines.’”127 This shows the 
Southern Union majority’s acknowledgement of the entire list from Ice (which 
included restitution), as well as its willingness to disregard fear that any on the 
list would be seriously imperiled if Apprendi were to be extended to it. 
Second, and vital for the potential inclusion of restitution under Apprendi’s 
umbrella, the makeup of Southern Union’s majority does not seem precarious 
or vulnerable to a significant change by the time the next Apprendi challenge 
reaches the Supreme Court.128 Justices Scalia and Thomas have consistently 
voted to extend and/or reinforce Apprendi when given the opportunity.129 
Justice Ginsburg had done the same until her opinion in Ice;130 however, it 
appears that she has abandoned at least a portion of her reservation with regard 
to extending the rule to cover the activities listed in that opinion. Finally, 
Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Chief Justice Roberts, while only being 
on the Court a relatively short time,131 have all shown their willingness to 
extend Apprendi further while on the bench.132 
 
 125. S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2352 n.5 (citations omitted). 
 126. Compare Ice, 555 U.S. at 171, with S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2352 n.5. 
 127. S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2352 n.5 (emphasis added). 
 128. The majority in Southern Union was made up of Sotomayor, Scalia, Thomas, Kagan, 
Ginsburg, and Roberts. Id. at 2348. 
 129. See supra cases discussed in Part II. 
 130. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 131. Chief Justice Roberts has served on the Court since 2005; Justice Sotomayor has served 
on the Court since 2009; Justice Kagan has served on the Court since 2010. 
 132. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan both voted to extend Apprendi’s rule in the one case they 
have had the opportunity to do so, while Justice Roberts has now twice voted in favor of 
extending Apprendi. See S. Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2348; Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 162 (2009). 
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III.  APPRENDI AND ITS PROGENY SUPPORT AN EXTENSION OF ITS RULE TO 
CRIMINAL RESTITUTION 
A. Restitution is a Criminal Penalty 
The first hurdle in the quest to have restitution recognized as a penalty that 
requires Sixth Amendment protection under Apprendi is to determine that it is 
indeed a criminal penalty, rather than a civil remedy. While the Supreme Court 
has not reviewed this specific issue, it has categorized restitution as a criminal 
penalty, albeit in a slightly different context. In Kelly v. Robinson, the Court 
held that a restitution order made under the VWPA is a criminal penalty, and 
not compensation.133 In support of its conclusion, the Court said: 
Although restitution does resemble a judgment “for the benefit of” the victim, 
the context in which it is imposed undermines that conclusion. The victim has 
no control over the amount of restitution awarded or over the decision to award 
restitution. Moreover, the decision to impose restitution generally does not turn 
on the victim’s injury, but on the penal goals of the State’s interests in 
rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim’s desire for 
compensation . . . . Because criminal proceedings focus on the State’s interests 
in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim’s desire for 
compensation, we conclude that restitution orders imposed in such proceedings 
operate “for the benefit of” the State . . . . The sentence following a criminal 
conviction necessarily considers the penal and rehabilitative interests of the 
State.134 
Not only has the Supreme Court spoken on restitution under the VWPA, 
but it has also addressed this general subject after the enactment of the MVRA. 
In Pasquantino v. United States, the Court held that “[t]he purpose of awarding 
restitution in this action is not to [collect a tax], but to mete out appropriate 
criminal punishment for that conduct.135 When Pasquantino is read together 
with Kelly, it seems likely that the Supreme Court will join the majority of the 
federal Courts of Appeals that have found restitution to be a criminal, rather 
than civil penalty.136 
 
 133. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52–53 (1986); Acker, supra note 32, at 822. 
 134. Id. at 52. 
 135. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 365 (2005). 
 136. Compare United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1217–18 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
restitution is a civil, not criminal, remedy), United States v. Bonner, 522 F.3d 804, 807 (7th Cir. 
2008), United States v. Millot, 433 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that restitution orders 
“are not in the nature of a criminal penalty”), and United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1279–
80 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that purpose of restitution under VWPA “is not to punish . . . but 
rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest extent possible, are made whole for their losses”), 
with United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122–23 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing then-
current state of circuit split and recognizing that the majority of circuits classify restitution as a 
criminal penalty), and United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 334–35 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2006) (en 
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In the years prior to the Court’s decision in Southern Union, the federal 
Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that judges may order restitution based 
on judge-found facts using a preponderance of the evidence standard at the 
sentencing hearing;137 these courts have given a variety of reasons for 
declining to apply Apprendi’s requirement of these facts to be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.138 One such justification given is that restitution, 
unlike the sentences of fines, incarcerations, or death, is a civil remedy rather 
than a criminal one, and therefore does not even invoke the Sixth 
Amendment.139 
In United States v. Newman, the Seventh Circuit was the first federal 
appellate court to adopt the view that restitution is a civil remedy with a purely 
compensatory purpose, as opposed to a criminal remedy with punitive, 
retributive, and deterrent goals and effects.140 In a subsequent case, United 
States v. Bach, Judge Richard Posner affirmed this view, describing restitution 
under the MVRA as a means of “enabl[ing] the tort victim to recover his 
damages in a summary proceeding ancillary to a criminal prosecution,” and 
describing the MVRA as “[f]unctionally . . . a tort statute.”141 However, this 
 
banc) (agreeing with the majority of federal Courts of Appeals that hold “restitution ordered as 
part of a criminal sentence [to be] criminal rather than civil in nature”). See also Acker, supra 
note 32, at 823. 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 404 (1st Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 120 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302, 1311–12 
(11th Cir. 2006); Leahy, 438 F.3d at 338–39; United States v. Nichols, 149 Fed. Appx. 149, 153 
(4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Swanson, 394 F.3d 520, 526 (7th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2005) (rehearing en banc 
denied); United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1316–17 (10th Cir. 2005). All federal 
restitution as we currently know it is ordered on judge-found facts on a preponderance standard. 
Therefore, each circuit that affirms restitution orders is necessarily endorsing restitution orders 
based on judge-found facts on a preponderance standard. 
 138. The two prevailing justifications for declining to extend Apprendi to restitution are that 
(1) restitution is a civil, rather than criminal, remedy, and therefore the Sixth Amendment is not 
implicated by restitution orders, and (2) because the federal restitution statutes provide for 
restitution for the “full amount of the victim’s losses,” there is no “statutory maximum” that 
would implicate Apprendi and the Sixth Amendment’s jury guarantee. A discussion of (1) 
immediately follows this footnote; see infra Part III.B for a discussion of (2). 
 139. See, e.g., Wolfe, 701 F.3d at 1217–18 (holding that restitution is a civil, not criminal, 
remedy); Bonner, 522 F.3d at 807; Millot, 433 F.3d at 1062 (stating that restitution orders “are 
not in the nature of a criminal penalty”); Nichols, 169 F.3d at 1279–80 (stating that purpose of 
restitution under VWPA “is not to punish . . . but rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest 
extent possible, are made whole for their losses”). 
 140. United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 537–42 (7th Cir. 1998). However, since the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Newman, only two other circuits have held restitution to be a civil, 
rather than criminal, remedy. See Nichols, 169 F.3d at 1279–80; Millot, 433 F.3d at 1062. 
 141. United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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was inconsistent not only with Supreme Court jurisprudence,142 but with 
precedent from the Seventh Circuit itself: Judge Posner’s Bach opinion did not 
reference or attempt to distinguish an earlier case from the Seventh Circuit, 
United States v. Fountain, in which Posner (also the author of the Fountain 
opinion) described “‘restitution’ in criminal law” as “the earliest criminal 
remedy . . . sanctioned not only by history but also by its close relationship to 
the retributive and deterrent purposes of criminal punishment.”143 Moreover, 
these two cases concerned two different federal restitution statutes,144 a 
potentially plausible basis for holding them to a different standard but for the 
Seventh Circuit’s own words in Newman in which it stated “restitution cannot 
be punishment under only one statute but not the other.”145 
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Southern Union did not alter 
the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in the recent case United States v. Wolfe.146 In 
Wolfe, the Seventh Circuit affirmed its prior decisions in Newman and Bach 
and explicitly declined to extend Apprendi to restitution, maintaining that it is a 
civil remedy that does not invoke the Sixth Amendment.147 However, this case 
should not be considered instructive for two reasons. First, while the opinion 
states that Apprendi questions are generally decided de novo in the Seventh 
Circuit,148 the defendant did not make an Apprendi argument at trial, and 
therefore his appeal was reviewed for plain error, a standard of review much 
more deferential to the trial judge than de novo.149 Second, Seventh Circuit 
case law establishes the requirement of a “compelling reason” to overrule its 
precedent,150 and while acknowledging that its view that restitution is a civil 
remedy rather than criminal is a minority view among the federal Courts of 
Appeals, “[b]eing in the minority is not enough” to change its established 
precedent.151 Because the few circuits that have ruled similarly to the Seventh 
Circuit have similar standards of review,152 it is unlikely that they will change 
 
 142. See supra Parts II.B, II.D. 
 143. United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 800 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Kleinhaus, supra 
note 17, at 2750–53. 
 144. In Fountain, the statute in question was the VWPA, compared to Bach where the MVRA 
was being analyzed. 
 145. Newman, 144 F.3d at 539. 
 146. United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1206 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 147. Id. at 1215–18. 
 148. Id. at 1216. 
 149. Id. However, the opinion goes on to state that the result would have likely been the same 
using either standard. Id. 
 150. Wolfe, 701 F.3d at 1217. 
 151. Id. at 1217. 
 152. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 2012) (declining to extend 
Apprendi to restitution on a plain error standard of review because defendant did not raise issue at 
trial). 
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positions without some action on the issue by the Supreme Court, which has 
more than one precedent describing restitution as a criminal penalty.153 
Despite this minority view in the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, all 
other federal Courts of Appeals that have ruled on this issue have held that 
restitution is indeed a criminal remedy that serves a punitive and deterrent 
purpose.154 These circuits have justified this conclusion using slightly different 
analyses, but the common threads between them are (1) reliance on Supreme 
Court precedent that has discussed the status of restitution as a criminal 
punishment,155 and (2) analyzing the history and purpose of restitution, both 
generally and in the context of the federal statutes at issue on appeal.156 
The Third Circuit in United States v. Leahy illustrates these analyses.157 In 
Leahy, both the majority and a substantial dissent agreed that the Supreme 
Court’s language in Kelly v. Robinson and Pasquantino v. United States 
supported the conclusion that restitution should be considered a criminal 
penalty for Sixth Amendment purposes.158 Quoting Pasquantino, the dissent 
recognized that “[t]he purpose of awarding restitution in this action [was] . . . 
to mete out appropriate criminal punishment for that conduct,”159 and cited the 
primary objectives of the defendants’ prosecution as “‘deterrence and 
punishment’ of criminal conduct, not ensuring compensation for the 
victims.”160 Further, the Leahy court affirmed and cited to a previous case 
holding that the VWPA and MVRA “specifically [indicate] that restitution 
orders are penalties that a district court may impose when sentencing a 
defendant,”161 and that “[r]estitution orders have long been treated as part of 
 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 133–36. 
 154. A large majority of federal Courts of Appeals characterize various restitution statutes as 
criminal sanctions. See United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122–23 & n.4 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing then-current state of circuit split and recognizing that the majority of circuits classify 
restitution as a criminal penalty); United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 334–35 & n.9 (3d Cir. 
2006) (en banc). 
 155. See supra text accompanying notes 133–36. 
 156. In federal courts, these are almost universally the VWPA and the MVRA. 
 157. Leahy, 438 F.3d at 328 (declining to extend Apprendi to restitution because the 
restitution statute contained no “statutory maximum”). The majority in Leahy held federal 
restitution to be a criminal, rather than civil, penalty. Id. at 335 (majority opinion). A five-judge 
dissent agreed with the majority’s analysis on this point, but would have ruled that Apprendi 
required the facts supporting restitution orders to be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. 
Id. at 347–48 (McKee, J., dissenting in part). 
 158. Id. at 341–43 (McKee, J., dissenting in part) (recognizing that classifying restitution as a 
criminal penalty was “required by the Supreme Court’s earlier decision[s]” in Kelly and 
Pasquantino). 
 159. Id. at 341 (quoting Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 350 (2005)) (emphasis 
added). 
 160. Id. at 341–42. 
 161. Id. (affirming United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 159 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
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the sentence for the offense of conviction.”162 These holdings make a 
compelling case for classifying restitution as a criminal penalty. 
Additionally, there are several pieces of legislative history for both the 
VWPA and MVRA that evince Congress’s intent that restitution orders arising 
from these statutes be considered for their punitive and deterrent effects.163 The 
VWPA’s Senate report discusses restitution as “an integral part of virtually 
every formal system of criminal justice,”164 and cites the “provi[sion of] 
maximum rehabilitative incentives to the offender” as the reason for the 
VWPA’s flexibility in ordering restitution.165 Similarly, the purpose section of 
the MVRA’s Senate report cites both the debt a defendant must pay to his or 
her victim alongside the debt the defendant pays to society at large as 
components of an order of restitution.166 Finally, the Congressional Record 
contains statements from multiple United States senators that highlight the 
“important penalogical [sic] function”167 of restitution, as well as 
acknowledging the MVRA as a “formidable deterrent to crime.”168 
In the face of both Supreme Court precedent and the substantial legislative 
history of the VWPA and MVRA that indicate Congress’s intent that 
restitution orders have a substantial punitive, deterrent, rehabilitative, and 
retributive effect, it seems clear that restitution is indeed a criminal remedy that 
should be classified as such when applying the Apprendi rule. 
The circuits holding that restitution is a criminal remedy have still declined 
to extend Apprendi to restitution, however, by determining that the federal 
restitution statutes have no “statutory maximum” to exceed, therefore making 
them ineligible for Sixth Amendment protection under Apprendi and its 
progeny. 
B. Blakely, Booker, and Southern Union Have Eliminated the “Statutory 
Maximum” Justification for Excluding Restitution from Apprendi’s Rule 
Most of the federal Courts of Appeals have found restitution to be a 
criminal penalty; however, they decline to extend Apprendi to restitution for 
another reason. In United States v. Day, the Fourth Circuit summarized this 
reason as follows: restitution, being mandatory for “the full extent of the 
victim’s harm” in the MVRA,169 has no “statutory maximum” as defined by 
 
 162. Leahy, 438 F.3d at 341 (affirming Syme, 276 F.3d at 159). 
 163. See Kleinhaus, supra note 17, at 2762 n.378 (summarizing the legislative history of the 
VWPA and MVRA that indicates Congress’s intent for restitution to be a criminal punishment). 
 164. S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 10 (1982). 
 165. Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
 166. S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 12 (1995). 
 167. 141 CONG. REC. S38,451 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 168. Id. at S38,460 (statement of Sen. McCain). 
 169. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2006). 
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the Apprendi line of cases, and therefore no finding by a judge can go beyond 
any maximum.170 This still occurs in spite of the evolution of the Supreme 
Court’s recitation of its Apprendi rule,171 which has removed most vestiges of 
the “statutory maximum” requirement, instead making clear that “[a]ny 
fact . . . which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum 
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be 
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”172 
However, federal Courts of Appeals have largely ignored this shift in the 
Supreme Court’s rule language, and have declined applying Apprendi to 
restitution orders on the grounds that the MVRA contains no “prescribed 
maximum penalty,” and therefore escapes Apprendi’s reach.173 
The circuits that have held this way have denied that Blakely altered the 
meaning of the term “statutory maximum” within the rule of Apprendi.174 
While the Eighth Circuit joined the Second Circuit in finding that restitution 
does not violate Apprendi because the MVRA prescribes no “statutory 
maximum,”175 it did so in spite of the Supreme Court’s own change in its 
definition of the term,176 and in the face of a dissent by one of the judges 
hearing the case.177 The dissent wrote that “after the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Blakely v. Washington, [the question of whether 
restitution is a criminal penalty that can be ‘increased . . . beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum’] becomes no longer difficult to answer.”178 
Despite the general acknowledgement among the federal circuits that Blakely 
had altered the understanding of “statutory maximum,” the analysis set forth in 
Carruth is still the preferred choice of courts that do not wish to apply 
Apprendi to the facts underlying restitution orders. 
On November 29, 2012, the Fourth Circuit was one of the first Courts of 
Appeals to speak on the issue after Southern Union was decided earlier that 
year. In United States v. Day,179 the defendant was convicted of wire fraud, 
 
 170. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]here is no 
prescribed statutory maximum in the restitution context; the amount of restitution that a court 
may order is instead indeterminate and varies based on the amount of damage and injury caused 
by the offense.”) (emphasis omitted); United States v. Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 454 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“[R]estitution is not subject to Apprendi because the statutes authorizing restitution, unlike 
ordinary penalty statutes, do not provide a determinate statutory maximum.”). 
 171. See supra Part II.B. 
 172. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). 
 173. See, e.g., United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 118 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 900 (8th Cir. 2005) (rehearing en banc denied). 
 174. See, e.g., Reifler, 446 F.3d at 118; Carruth, 418 F.3d at 900. 
 175. Carruth, 418 F.3d at 902–04. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 81–97. 
 177. Carruth, 418 F.3d at 905 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
 178. Id. 
 179. United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 713 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and 
conspiracy to commit smuggling.180 The defendant appealed his sentence, 
which consisted of incarceration, fines, forfeitures, and restitution; the fines 
and restitution orders amounted to more than nine million dollars.181 While the 
court correctly justified the three million dollar fine under the framework of 
Southern Union,182 it declined to overturn the defendant’s restitution order, 
stating that: 
Critically, however, there is no prescribed statutory maximum in the restitution 
context; the amount of restitution that a court may order is instead 
indeterminate and varies based on the amount of damage and injury caused by 
the offense. As a consequence, the rule of Apprendi is simply not implicated to 
begin with by a trial court’s entry of restitution. As the Sixth Circuit aptly 
explained in United States v. Sosebee, “restitution is not subject to [Apprendi] 
because the statutes authorizing restitution, unlike ordinary penalty statutes, do 
not provide a determinate statutory maximum.” That logic was sound when 
written before Southern Union, and it remains so today.183 
The Day court’s reliance on a statute’s status as “indeterminate” or 
“vari[able] based on the amount of damage and injury caused by the offense” 
is misplaced. This logic is dependent on the Supreme Court’s endorsement that 
any form of punishment184 that is “indeterminate” need not be subject to 
Apprendi’s rule. The Court has explicitly rejected this line of reasoning. In 
Southern Union, the Court made it clear that the rule of Apprendi applies to all 
“‘sentence[s],’ ‘penalties,’ or ‘punishments’” regardless of the type of facts 
required to support said sentence, penalty, or punishment.185 Further, it 
specifically addressed these “indeterminate” types of statutes, stating that even 
where the amount of a fine is calculated using the “amount of the defendant’s 
gain or the victim’s loss,”186 “[a jury finding these facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt] is necessary to implement Apprendi ‘s animating principle: the 
preservation of the jury’s historic role as a bulwark between the State and the 
 
 180. Id. at 716. The defendant, Roger Day Jr., was found to be the “mastermind of a multi-
million dollar scheme to defraud the Department of Defense.” Id. 
 181. Id. at 731–33. 
 182. The court correctly pointed out that the defendant’s own admissions had established that 
he had received a gain of at least $2.16 million; the statute in question subjected the defendant to 
fines up to “twice the gross gain” produced by the offense. Id. at 731–32. The defendant’s 
admission to this fact was key, because Apprendi’s rule (as stated by the Court in Southern 
Union) precludes only “judicial fact-finding that enlarges the maximum punishment a defendant 
faces beyond what the jury’s verdict or the defendant’s admissions allow.” S. Union Co. v. 
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2352 (2012). 
 183. Day, 700 F.3d at 732 (second emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 184. See S.Union, 132 S. Ct. at 2351 (“In stating Apprendi’s rule, we have never distinguished 
one form of punishment from another.”). 
 185. Id. at 2350–51. 
 186. Id. at 2351. 
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accused at the trial for an alleged offense.”187 Thus, it is clear that there is no 
intelligible distinction between statutes with “determinate” amounts of 
punishment as opposed to “indeterminate” amounts of punishment; if any 
punishment is inflicted, the facts that support that punishment must be found 
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Court first established the specific form of protection the Sixth 
Amendment affords criminal defendants under Apprendi, it embarked upon a 
slow, steady march to include all forms of criminal sentences under its reach. 
The Court has generally shown little fear in extending Apprendi to cover more 
forms of “punishments” and “penalties” in the application of its rule. Given the 
recent choice of language used by the Court in its Apprendi jurisprudence, I 
believe that the inclusion of restitution under the moniker of “punishment” is 
inevitable. The reasons given by the circuit courts for declining to extend 
Apprendi are tenuous at best, and given the expansive nature of the opinions in 
the Apprendi line of cases (as well as the current Supreme Court language that 
describes restitution) it seems very likely that restitution will be the newest 
resident of “Apprendi-land” in the not-so-distant future. 
What happens next will be an interesting occurrence in itself. If Apprendi 
is indeed applied to restitution, what will become of the current sentencing 
procedure under the federal statutes? Will the prosecution be compelled to 
introduce the evidence necessary to support a restitution order at trial, or will 
the jury be held over to perform its duty at a sentencing hearing? Will an 
entirely new jury be selected for use at the sentencing hearing? The 
implications on the sentencing procedure are profound, and will be sure to 
spark protest from prosecutors and judges nation-wide. In the words of Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence in Apprendi, “[we cannot operate on the] erroneous and 
all-too-common assumption that the Constitution means what we think it ought 
to mean. It does not; it means what it says.”188 If it says that all facts that 
support criminal punishments or penalties must be proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then the criminal justice system will just have to play along. 
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